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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH

I·:Ll L\
rrlCI~~,

J l,.~~-, I C 1 1 ~, L.A \r HE:\CE .J lTSand ARrrlt1:R A \'"l 1~RJ~rrT\
Pfaint iffs a Jld Re.'-·l;ond en f.-.,·,

-vs.1

~ri ..:\XD.ARD

Case No.
9326

(ilt.jSONITE CC):\lP_.:\K\"'",
Defendant aud Appellant.

BRIEF OF RERPONDENTS

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Counsel for the Plaintiff's agree with the statement
of f aet~ except as other"rise noted herein.
There is absolutely nothing in the record that discloses any instructions from Pinder to 1\IcMullin to obtain the ~ervices of an independent mining contractor to
open up a dormant mine shaft.
Contrary to Defendant's contentions "rith reference
to \\Tho \Ya~ in control and had the supervision over plaintiffs La"Trence Justice and .t\rthur Averett the court
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found that all three ,,·ere en1ployees of Standard Gilsonite Company. (See Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law.)
It would appear that had plaintiff, Elba Justice,
retained the $520.00 check paid to him by Standard
Gilsonite Company, it still \vould not have precluded
thP plaintiff's from collecting the balance of their claims.
(See 34-10-7 lTtah Code Annotated, 1953).
The plaintiffs presented their claims ti1nely and
the la\v suit \\ras not delayed by any intentional acts of
plaintiffs, but had to be filed pursuant to 34-10-6 (U.C.A.
1953), when it became apparent that the Defendant 'vas
not going to pay Respondents claims.
STATEl\1EXT OF POINTS
POINT I
THE RULING OF THE DISTRICT COURT BELOW APPLYING TITLE 34, SECTION 10, PARAGRAPH 6, U.C.A.
(1953) TO THIS CASE WAS NOT ERROR.
POINT II
THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT COMlVIIT ERROR IN
UPHOLDING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF TITLE 34,
SECTION 10, PARAGRAPH 6, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED,
(1953).
A. SAID STATUTE IS CONSTI'TUTIONAL AND IS NOT
A DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS OF LAW AND EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW.
B. SAID STATUTE IS CONSTITUTIONAL WHEN
APPLIED 'TO THIS CASE, AND DOES NOT DEPRIVE THE
EMPLOYER OF DUE PROCESS OF LAW AND EQUAL PRO-
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3
TECTION OF THE LAW WHEN THE EXIST ANCE OF AN
EMPLOYER El\IPLOYEE RELATIONSHIP IS, IN FACT,
IN DISPUTE.

POINT I
THE RULING OF THE DISTRICT COURT BELOvV APPLYING TITLE 34, SECTION 10, PARAGRAPH 6, U.C.A.
(1953) TO THIS CASE WAS NOT ERROR.

rrhe Distriet Court found that the plaintiffs ,\.l~re
eu1ployees of the defendant company and therefor this
court is not concerned \\·ith the employee-e1nploy<•r relationship. Defendant's O\Yn brief on page G states ''unless the plaintiffs here "\Vere clearly employees, on the
pa~·roll ... etc.'' the penalt)· statute "\vould not apply.
The court in its Findings of Fact and ·Conclusions
of I.Ja\Y held the plaintiffs to be '"clearly e1nployees."
Plaintiffs \VPre furnished ti1ne sheets by Ralph
O'X eill to fill out for purposes of paying the1n "\vages.
POINT II
THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT COl\Il\IIT ERROR IN
UPHOLDING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF TITLE 34,
SECTION 10, PARAGRAPH 6, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED,
(1953).
A. SAID STATUTE IS CONSTI'TUTIONAL AND IS NOT
A DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS OF LAW AND EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW.

The basic and first premise that n1ust be adhered
to is that the la\YS as passed by the legislature are presnnled to be constitutional and a statute of the type in-
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volved in this case is tlearl:T \vithin the police
the state to enact.

po\\~er

of

The statute involved in this matter is not a denial
of due process of la\Y or the Pqual protection elause of
the constitution. The basic eon~ideration involYed in thi;--;
statute is one of 1nerely protecting the rights of the einployees \vhen the employer fails to pay \\·ages that are
due and O\\Ting and attached thereto is the penalt:· proYiSlOn.

\V e find in the case of S ch a lz v. L-:- n io Jl S chao! D i.strict, ·Calif.-137 P2d 7G2, 766 (1943) the follo\ving:

"The purpose and intent of the act is plain
and its object should not be defeated by overnice
construction ... It is not the punish1nent of the
offender in the sense ordinarily applicable to the
term, but rather the recovery of the penalty as a
fixed sum by way of indemnity to the public hy
reason of the violation of the statute, and to
charge him a pecuniary liability.H
Here we are presented \Yith a question concerning
the po,ver of the State to impose penalties for violation
of its statutory functions. The presun1ption is that such
enactments are a legislative n1atter, and the courts should
be hesitant to meddle therein. It is the usual 1nethod
imposed to co1npel the perfor1nance of duties or c.onduct
required by the State in carrying out its varied sovereign
functions. Thus a legislature 1nay i1npose any reasonable
penalty it sees fit for the violation of valid regulations.
There is no inhibition upon the State to impose such
penalties for disregard of its police power as \vill insure
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protnpt ohedieneP to tlu~ requi re1nent~ of ~uch rPgulations.
(~;~ .Jn1. Jur. ()~(i) (Al~o ~PP J.llarlouna r. State-Cal. App.
:!d--:~1:2 r~. 2d :2;-17-1957.)

rrhe ~I adonna rase, in quoting fron1 Schalz c. lJ n ion
!"''cltool !Jist riel. ~upra, ~tated that the penalty provisions
a:' pronounced b~· the (iourt \YPl'P not in violation of the
due pro<·Ps~ clau~P. Thi~ case involved a suit to recover
1noney that "'"as \\·ithheld fro1n a contractor frorn his
l'inal payn1ent as a penalt~· \vhen the eontractor violated
the labor code. 11he Court held that the due proce~~ elause
\\·a~ not violated h~· such a procedurP.
Coun:-'el for the defendant corporation appPars to
ba~e hi~ allegation solei~· upon the di~proportionate pec·nniary lo~~ of the defendant corporation and sets forth
ex~unple~ stating the in1propriety and unreasonablenes~
of ~uch a penalty. The exa1nples that he discusses are
not the fact~ a~ ~Pt forth in thi~ case.
rrhe reason for the penalty provisions Ill this case
and in all other cases is to insurP there \\·ill not be flagrant violation of the statutes as provided by the Legislature, and if and in the event the statutes are, in fact,
violated, then a penalty provision is provided against
the \Yrongdoer for the benefit and protection of the
public.
,,. . e find in the case of Department of Social Welfare
of State r. Gardiner, ______ Cal. ______ , ~10 P.2d 855, 856
(1949) quoting 21 RCL, page 212, the follo,v-ing:
.. Penalties are i1nposed in furtherance of
son1e public policy and as a means of securing
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obedience to lavv. Persons \Vho incur them are,
either in morals or la\v, \vrongdoers, and not
simply unfortunate debtors unable to perfor1n
their pecuniary obligations."
In the above-stated case, a statute in California provided
that the State of ·California could recover hcice the
amount paid to a person for old age assistance if it \vas
later discovered that the person so helped had, in fact,
property and assets that he had failed to disclose to the
State of ·California; that the State could recover t\vice
the amount paid to the person receiving assistance. The
Court in that case held that it was clearly \vithin the
legislative power of the State to invoke such a penalty
and that it \\Tas not unreasonable and unconstitutional.
The penalty provisions as provided in 3±-10-6 (a) of
the Utah Code Annotated ( 1953) does not fall \\Tithin this
category and certainly cannot be construed as being unconstitutional.
\\T e find that in the very early case of St. Louis v.

Paul, G-!: .L.\_rk. 83, 40 S.\V". 705, 37 LRA 30±, G~ Am. St.
Rep. 154, 173 lT.S. -!0-!, ±3 L. ED. 7±6 (1899), that an
Arkansas Legislative act requiring railroad co1npanies
to pay their employees \\Then discharged their unpaid
\vages then earned \\Ti thout deduction, or such \vages
should continue at the same rate until paid, but not to
c.rcccrl 60 days con~titutional. (En1p. ours) The Court in
that case held that such an act \Vas not in violation of
the e<1ual protection of the la\Y clause. The Court said
that such an act \vas prospective and its operation and
restricting future contracts only, and does not deprive
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the railroad co1npany of their property "Tithout due
p ro(•ps~ of la " ..
..,:\ penalty provision, to be unconstitutional, must be
grossly opprPs~ive and disproportionate to the offense
connnitted before it can, under any stretch of the imagination, hP declared to be void. (See Goorh, et al., v. Rogers,
et al., 1~);~ Or. 158, 238 P.2d 25-l-, ~~5-286-1951.)
The eases eited in the Appellant's brief, In \vhich
the Court~ have held certain penalty provisions unconstitutional is due to the fact that theTe is not a li1nitation
placed upon the penalty provisions in the statute. This
is basically the reason \vhy they have been held to be
unconstitutional, and there are cases \\rhich have been
decided both for and .against the constitutionality of
penalty statutes. The \Veight of authority, however,
favors the validity of penalty statutes, when enacted by
the Legi~lature to correct a \vilful disre·gard for indiYidual rights. An accumulation of the authority and cases
eited therein are discussed in 12 ALR 612, ~6 ALR 1200,
1396 and the supplements thereto.
\\'" e find in the case Nordling v. Johnson, ______ Or.
______ , :!S3 P2d 994, 289 P:2d -J-:20, ( ______ ) -1-8 ALR 2d 1369,
a case \\Thich is analogous to the instant case. The question involved in that case in the Annotation that follows
has to do \vith the assignability of the statutory penalty
\\Then it is invoked. The Supre1ne Court of Oregon did not
hesitate in holding that the \vages due and the penalty
provision for said wages \Vas constitutional \Yithout any
question \vhatsoever.
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The penalty proviston in that ca~e provided that
\Yhere a \\~illful failure to pay a discharged Plllployee hi~
wages \vhen due, then the \vages shall continue at the
sa1ne rate until paid, unlP~~ action therefon· is eolnrnenced, but not 1nore than 30 day~. Our StatutP proYicle:-;
that it is 1uandatory that the action be connnenced \Yithin
60 days frorn the date of separation and that is exaetly
\vhat \Ya~ done in this ca~e. The case involved here and
the one in the Oregon case sets up a definite tinH· for the
statute to he invoked and has a cut-off date. The ea~(·~
cited by counsel for the defendant are void on their
face pri1narily because the:~ do not put a lin1itation on the
length of ti1ne or the a1nount that can be charged under
the penalt:T provi~ions. Clearly the Court can hold and
have held that such statutes that are of a continuing
nature cannot be constitutional because the e1nployer
could never ascertain the limitation of his liability.
Our statutP on the other hand is not lmreasonabls,
eapricious, arbitrary, or an1biguous~ and a~ such, it
clearly defines the a1nount that the e1nployers \Yill be
eharged for \Yilful failure to pay his en1ployees \\~age~
duP upon discharge. Ile is put on notice by the statute
that if he fails to pay said \vages and the en1ployee makes
a de1nand for pay1nent of said funds that the en1ployer
\\~ill suffer a penalty, but in no case \vill it be for an
a1nount greater than 60 days "rages.
Based upon the cases, and 1nore especially the l:-.7ordling v. Joluu·don, supra, tht)re cannot be any inference to
the penalt:T provisions in the statute attacked by the
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defendant are uncon~titutional. ·Clearly it is \vithin the
province of the Legislature to enact la\vs for the betterInent of society and to pron1ote the best \\·elfare of it~
tnentbers and further, it is the prerogative of said legi:--:lature to envokP penalties for the enforce1nent of its
statutes.
It is obvious that a statute in its relationship to
,,·ages and a penalt~· for failing to pa~· the ~tnne i:-; indeed
fair, reasonable and susceptible to a constitutional interpretation that it is valid.
The defendant corporation kne\v that if they \Villfully
refused to pay the just clai1ns of the plaintiffs herein,
that they \vould be subjecting themselves to the proviHions
that are contained in Title 3-t, Section 10, paragraph G,
l~tah Code Annotated, 1953. Penal statutes have for their
purpose the punishment of an employer for willful failure
to 1nake payment of wages when due, and by such provisions the employee is given a preferred position \Yith
respect to the \vages due and eertainly this is not an
unreasonable restraint upon the employer. The defendant
corporation is not in any "·ay denied due process of la\v
or the equal protection of the la,v, nor have they been
denied their day in Court under threat of excessive
penalty.
B. SAID STATUTE IS CONSTITUTIONAL WHEN
APPLIED 'TO THIS CASE, AND DOES NOT DEPRIVE THE
EMPLOYER OF DUE PROCESS OF LAW AND EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW WHEN THE EXISTANCE OF AN
EMPLOYER EMPLOYEE RELATIONSHIP IS, IN FACT,
IN DISPUTE.
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Counsel for the defendant corporation feels that said
corporation has been severely and oppressively put in a
position whereby they cannot have their day in Court,
unless and until the employee-employer relationship
is first decided. Certainly the law provides ren1edies to
ascertain the employer-employee relationship "·ithout
\vaiting for the statutory time of the penalty in which to
file a -claim has already run.
Certainly there \Vas no question in the Courts n1ind
that the employee-employer relationship existed and
based on that fact the defendant corporation is not being
severely punished because it failed to adhere to the provisions as set forth in 34-10-6 Utah Code Annotated, 1953.
There is not a permanent infringement nor a temporary
infringement upon the constitutional rights of the defendant corporation, and \vhen a la\\Tful demand is 1nade
for "Tages to an employee, they n1ay either pay the \Ya.ges
due or refuse to pay the "·ages and subject then1selYe~
to the penalty provision of 34-10-6. Thi~ is not arbitrary
or capricious and the defendant corporation have elected

to deny the clain1s, subjecting then1selves to the penalty
provision of the statute.
The statute in its application
penalt~,.

provision and it

i~

Is

not a retroactive

not unreasonable and burden-

sou1e upon the defendant. The statute is definite as to
the time "'"hen the

penalt~T

begins to run and further

thro\Ys the burden upon thP plaintiffs to n1ake a de1uand
for their ",.agrs. For the defendant to

\Yillfull~·

refuse to
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pay said clai1n hP subjects hirnself to the penalty provi-

sion of the statute.
The plaintiffs in this 1natter spent a great deal of
ti1nP in negotiations and in trying to seek a settlement
'vith the defendant corporation and did not deliberately
,,·ait for the penalty statute to accumulate. The plaintiffs, however, could not wait beyond the 60 day period in
order to protect their rights. This statute is purely social
in nature to protect a certain class of citizens, and the
statute is constitutional.
CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted to this Court, that the
statute in question herein, r~ritle 34, Chapter 10, Section
6, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, is clearly constitutional
and the lower court was correct in its decision in this
n1atter and the Court should not be reversed.
Dated this 23rd day of October, _..\.D. 19GO.
Respectfully submitted,
JOHN C. BEASLIN
SIMMONS, BEASLIN & NYGAARD

Attorneys for Plaintiffs
423 West ~lain
Vernal, Utah
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